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 When the Profile Becomes the 
Population: Examining Privacy 
Governance and Road Traffic 
Surveillance in Canada and Australia 
Ian Warren, Randy Lippert, Kevin Walby and Darren Palmer*  
Abstract 
Use of automated licence/number plate recognition (‘ALPR/ANPR’) technologies in 
Canada and Australia raises significant policy questions for privacy advocates and 
criminal justice practitioners. The proliferation of mass surveillance through 
ALPR/ANPR also presents several conceptual puzzles about the links among criminal 
justice data flows, individual privacy and state responsibility in this actuarial age. In this 
article, we use case studies of ALPR/ANPR in Canada and Australia to examine privacy 
as a technique for governing road traffic surveillance. We explain our findings in light of 
Harcourt’s (2007) argument against the use of actuarial prediction and ‘hit rates’ that are 
rationalised as the chief measure of law enforcement activities and effectiveness. Finally, 
we question the regulation of surveillance technologies such as ALPR/ANPR through 
current Canadian and Australian information privacy laws, with specific focus on privacy 
by design (‘PbD’), a strategy that favours improving law enforcement efficiency at the 
expense of privacy. 
Introduction 
The dilemma of reconciling law enforcement mandates with information privacy rights has 
international relevance. This tension is acute in situations where law enforcement agencies 
adopt new technologies to replace manual identity matching and criminal history checks 
involving a growing range of publicly accessible and private information. Digital 
technologies enable the rapid sorting of increased volumes of information to assist with the 
efficient detection and prevention of serious crime and enforcing a larger array of low-level 
fines (Brown et al 2013). Automated data sorting is increasingly evident in contemporary 
law enforcement through mobile applications of camera surveillance technologies,  
such as Automatic Licence Plate Recognition (‘ALPR’). However, the  
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mass-population screening potential of these technologies (see Harris 2013; Cousineau 
2013; Derby 2011) raises important questions about determining the proper balance between 
legitimate law enforcement activity, the public interest and privacy. 
This article examines the impact of information privacy law and compliance structures in 
light of the emergence of road traffic surveillance technologies to which both Canadian and 
Australian drivers are increasingly subject. The article has comparative resonance, 
especially for scholars working in these and other common law countries with similar 
information privacy and criminal justice regimes. Our research examining the logics of 
privacy governance and law enforcement practice suggests current privacy law has limited 
scope to restrict the expansion of new surveillance and data-sharing technologies that have 
become routine in contemporary policing. We first examine the Canadian and Australian 
contexts of privacy governance. We then assess the rationales deployed to justify the 
expansion of road traffic surveillance in both countries and the possible effects of such 
surveillance on privacy more generally. We also raise questions about the effectiveness of 
this approach to traffic control by drawing on Harcourt’s (2007) examination of the ‘ratchet 
effect’ of data sorting in law enforcement, and ‘elasticity’, a term invoked to highlight the 
limitations of these initiatives in reducing aggregate rates of crime and disorder. 
We illustrate these processes by analysing information privacy law used to regulate 
ALPR deployment in Canada, or Automatic Number Plate Recognition (‘ANPR’) as it is 
termed in Australia (‘ALPR/ANPR’ except where these are discussed in a particular 
national context). ALPR/ANPR is commonly used for the automated collection of tolls on 
public or privately managed roads, ‘controlling access to restricted areas, [administering] 
congestion taxes, monitoring freight movement and calculating fees for unattended car 
parks’ (VLRC 2010:114). Historically, road traffic control via law enforcement involved 
multiple forms of manual data matching that required police to access vehicle registration 
and personal licence information from various discrete sources (O’Malley 2010, 2013). Both 
Canadian and Australian law enforcement authorities consider ALPR/ANPR valuable in 
reducing ‘auto theft and motor vehicle violations … related to prohibited, suspended, 
unlicensed and uninsured drivers’ (Denham 2012:11) and those driving under the influence 
of illicit drugs (Wilson 2012). Evidence in both jurisdictions indicates these classes of driver 
are overrepresented in road collisions and fatalities (Hooper 2013:15).  
However, the perceived benefits of fixed or mobile ALPR/ANPR are ‘not limited to 
detecting traffic related offences’ (Murphy 2010). This technology can also assist in tracking 
the movements of organised crime suspects (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law 
Enforcement 2012), ‘gang members, drug traffickers and sexual predators’ (Derby 
2011:161). CrimTrac, Australia’s leading data repository for DNA samples (Briody and 
Prenzler 2005), considers ANPR ‘one of the most significant breakthroughs in intelligence-
led policing’ (CrimTrac 2008:33), and favours centralised storage and dissemination of all 
ANPR data collected by Australian state police agencies to enhance ‘national security’ and 
‘community safety’ (CrimTrac 2008:34). Equivalent road traffic control, criminal 
investigations and security benefits are also recognised (Gaumont and Babineau 2008) and 
questioned (McArthur 2012) in Canada. The appeal of automated data collection, storage 
and dissemination among law enforcement officials therefore requires inquiry into how 
information privacy law governs these technologies. 
This article critically appraises diverse approaches to privacy governance in Ontario, 
Canada, and Victoria, Australia, given the rapid emergence of ALPR/ANPR as a potentially 
valuable and efficient law enforcement technology in these jurisdictions. Our comparative 
examination identifies distinct approaches to the governance of privacy, which variously 
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work to constrain or promote further deployment of ALPR/ANPR. Our approach helps to 
identify and question key rationales for the adoption and acceptance of new surveillance 
technologies, while interrogating the value of privacy as way to curtail the unregulated flow 
of personal data between multiple public and private agencies. We highlight similarities and 
differences in the use of privacy as a form of governance with potential to address 
regulatory gaps associated with new and emerging technologies that automate otherwise 
manual police detection and information-sorting processes.  
This analysis draws on Harcourt’s (2007) argument that questions how identity tracking 
and actuarial data-sorting technologies are commonly endorsed by referring to ‘hit rates’. 
Harcourt (2007:112–14) demonstrates that the use of ‘hit rates’ as the dominant measure of 
law enforcement effectiveness leads to disproportionate targeting of those with an 
identifiable record of previous ‘hits’. New surveillance technologies that efficiently identify 
hit rates enable police ‘to make discriminations among populations’ based on ‘pure 
information’ or an individual’s recorded ‘data double’ (Haggerty and Ericson 2000:614). 
Harcourt argues hit rates are a false measure of police effectiveness, because they overlook 
how those with no recorded ‘hits’ might contribute to aggregate patterns of offending. Thus, 
the actuarial potential of ALPR/ANPR technology may be limited when it is deployed to 
target individuals with a recorded ‘criminal and traffic violation history’ (Meehan and 
Ponder 2002:406), or at ‘hot spots’ where lawbreakers are more likely to be detected 
(Koper, Taylor and Woods 2013). Selective deployment fails to account for potential 
differences between the ‘elasticity’ (that is, group capacity to change behaviour in light of 
changes in policing activity, such as profiling) of the profiled and non-profiled groups, and 
fails to account for a potential ‘ratchet effect’, a self-fulfilling prophecy involving increasing 
disproportionality that occurs when police continually profile the higher traffic-violating 
group. While based on different assumptions about offending behaviour (Harcourt 2007), 
the impact of ‘elasticity’ and the ‘ratchet effect’ can lead to overall increases, rather than 
decreases, in the prohibited targeted behaviour in the population. This possible consequence 
is entirely missed when hit rates are used as the exclusive measure of ALPR/ANPR’s 
success. 
Harcourt’s critique of actuarial profiling reveals several less celebrated by-products of 
ALPR/ANPR and equivalent information sorting and identification technologies that are 
claimed to prevent or reduce prohibited behaviour. The potential for ALPR/ANPR to be 
deployed at ‘hot spots’ or ‘hot times’ when offending is most likely to be detected and then 
be used to surveil the entire driving population because overall rates of traffic offending 
have not declined, is a key example of ‘when the profile becomes the population’. We 
consider Harcourt’s prospects of fully randomised checks as one policy alternative to 
address the problem of selective profiling. We do so in part because of the limited capacity 
of information privacy law to counter the widely touted benefits of ALPR/ANPR in 
improving road safety and streamlining fine enforcement (O’Malley 2013:295). Finally, we 
raise questions about the value of Ontario’s approach to information privacy through 
‘privacy by design’ (‘PbD’) (Lippert and Walby 2013). By requiring police to invoke more 
stringent technical controls, such as improved data encryption (Diffie and Landau 2010) to 
comply with privacy requirements, PbD sanctions mass population surveillance and 
implicitly endorses claims of improved law enforcement efficiency, national security and 
public safety. 
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Order, technology, and road traffic control 
ALPR/ANPR is part of the next generation of video surveillance (Norris 2011), which 
combines public camera surveillance with population analysis. Images taken from 
ALPR/ANPR can be automatically compared with other mass-population data stored in 
national databases operated and managed by government departments or private entities. 
Once discrete information, such as criminal, driving or by-law infraction records, is now 
digitally amalgamated. However, the extent to which technology is used in road traffic 
enforcement differs across jurisdictions. 
O’Malley (2010) pinpoints three interrelated developments associated with the perceived 
necessity for new surveillance technology to assist with road traffic management. These are: 
the mass population surge that justifies automated modes of order maintenance to minimise 
the burdens of manually checking errant criminal and driving histories; the availability of 
technology as a suitable proxy for real-time enforcement measures, such as the use of 
checkpoints; and the concept of the ‘dividual’. Dividualisation involves the aggregation of 
personalised identity records into ‘masses, samples, data, markets, or banks’ (Deleuze 
1992:5 emphasis in original). In road traffic enforcement, ‘data doubles’ (Haggerty and 
Ericson 2000:613–4) emerge from the digitisation of vehicle registration, driver licensing 
and police enforcement records (O’Malley 2010:796). The primary identifier is the vehicle 
registration plate. Its unique signifier can be automatically linked to previous offences 
directly associated with the vehicle, including auto theft, emissions and safety violations, or 
lapsed registration. These vehicle records generate secondary links to the ‘data double’ of 
the registered vehicle owner that can reveal individual offences such as licence invalidity, 
outstanding fines or other recorded offences. The automated cross-matching of vehicle and 
individual licensing with criminal offence records is seemingly devoid of human error and 
can be linked to other forms of data administered by government or private organisations, 
such as computerised vehicle or personal insurance records that do not necessarily relate 
directly to road traffic enforcement. 
A central variable in the relationship between privacy and efficient road traffic control is 
the ability of police to match data collected by multiple agencies. Historically, police 
maintained independent records of suspect vehicle registration plates, or manually inspected 
driving licences whenever a potential infraction was detected. Today, automated data 
matching is possible using technologies deployed by public vehicle registration, law 
enforcement or insurance authorities operating in different provincial, state or national 
jurisdictions. ALPR/ANPR offers the additional benefit of matching electronic information 
identifying a registration plate — and even the driver or passenger — at the time and 
location the image is recorded with existing police records, registration data or private 
tollway and insurance information. Records of previous ‘hits’ alert police to a suspect 
vehicle, indicating that further investigation into any criminal or regulatory breaches linked 
to that vehicle or its registered owner is warranted. Although the majority of vehicle plate 
information entered into ALPR/ANPR systems generates no alert warning, the technology 
automatically matches road traffic and criminal enforcement ‘hits’ to instantly identify 
registered drivers with relevant ‘data doubles’ that record outstanding fines or warrants as 
well as any number of additional legal infractions. The potential law enforcement gains of 
this form of ‘mass surveillance’ are clear given the cumbersome nature of manually sifting 
multiple police, registration or private road traffic databases. The efficient flow of 
information between multiple agencies is evident in the following description of how ALPR 
operates in British Columbia: 
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A police officer who is not using ALPR visually identifies a vehicle of interest and enters its 
license plate number into a mobile workstation to query the ICBC, Canadian Police 
Information Centre (‘CPIC’) and Police Records Information Management Environment 
(‘PRIME’) databases. This provides the officer with information related to the license plate, 
such as the name of the registered owner, whether that owner has a driver’s license, and 
whether the vehicle is insured. After evaluating the results, the officer decides whether or not 
further investigation is warranted (Denham 2012:11–12). 
Some jurisdictions have imposed restrictions on the collection and retention of data about 
the movement of vehicles with no previous enforcement records, or ‘non-hits’. For example, 
legislation in Maine, United States, requires police to remove all ‘non-hit’ data every 
21 days. In Germany, a Federal Constitutional Court has ruled the retention of data about 
vehicles with no previous road traffic violations contravenes the right to ‘informational self-
determination’ (Denham 2012:10). In the United Kingdom, ALPR/ANPR is used for various 
‘policing and intelligence purposes’ (Derby 2011:160) and is admissible evidence in 
criminal trials. Data can be retained for up to two years for a specified enforcement purpose 
in accordance with relevant privacy and human rights laws (VLRC 2010:114; NPIA 
2009:19). These divergent approaches to data retention contrast with the improved 
efficiencies of automated vehicle and driver identity verification through ALPR/ANPR and 
related law enforcement technologies. This tension highlights the importance of comparative 
inquiry into how privacy standards are established for this form of law enforcement 
surveillance. 
Privacy is significant for all vehicle owners identified by ALPR/ANPR systems, 
regardless of their previous history of ‘hits’ and ‘non-hits’. Equally, privacy is a significant 
concern when police deploy ALPR/ANPR to detect behaviour unrelated to road traffic 
control. These issues warrant consideration in light of police claims that ALPR/ANPR 
enhances traffic management, road safety and data sharing between law enforcement 
agencies, independently of its potential to assist with other criminal investigations. Before 
assessing these claims, it is necessary to outline how Canadian and Australian administrative 
law protects the right to privacy as a counterpoint to the mass collection and sharing of 
personal information among public and private organisations. 
Canadian information privacy law and policy 
Privacy laws are designed to limit technological intrusion and the uses of personal 
information by government and private agencies. However, the operation of these regulatory 
and compliance models differs in each provincial, state and national jurisdiction. Canada 
and Australia share similar multi-tiered administrative structures that aim to protect five key 
information privacy principles: 
Control over information, including the assurance that personal information will be used 
according to contractual arrangements; 
Secrecy of information, including the ability to escape surveillance or protect against unwanted 
prying, or access to anonymity; 
Desire to protect personal space, involving the psychological need to retreat to non-social 
space (even if in the public arena) to engage in individual activities; 
Right to keep secrets, involving rules defining institutional, social, political or administrative 
limits to collecting and sharing information; 
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Data security, including the development of appropriate technical safeguards against 
unauthorized access to protected information (Leman-Langlois 2008:113). 
In Canada, the foundation of privacy law is preserved by the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, which establishes ‘the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure’ 
(Constitution Act 1982 (Can) s 8). Several common law rulings identify ‘a reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ as the key constraint on intrusive search and seizure procedures 
(Johnson 2011). Canada also has several national and provincial statutes establishing a 
compliance model for the use of surveillance and personal information by public and private 
organisations. The federal Privacy Act 1985 (Can) governs the collection, use and right to 
access personal information from any national public service or ‘government institution’. 
The federal Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act 2000 (Can) (‘PIPEDA’) 
s 4) regulates the collection and use of personal information by private sector organisations 
for ‘commercial activities’. Every Canadian province has a Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (‘FIPPA’) that regulates the collection of personal information by 
provincial government agencies, while Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Acts (‘MFIPPA’) apply to local government authorities, including many police 
agencies.1 Federal and provincial Privacy Commissioners have powers to investigate 
complaints into suspected privacy breaches and distribute relevant compliance directives 
under their respective jurisdictions.  
Within this multi-tiered public and private administrative legal structure, compliance 
largely depends on the trust conferred on public bureaucracies or private businesses. This 
has contributed to the ‘uneven diffusion of systems’ and standards for the administration of 
many law enforcement and crime-prevention technologies, including open space closed-
circuit television (Hier and Walby 2011). Below we demonstrate the limited ability of 
provincial Privacy Commissions to implement clear and transparent standards for the use of 
surveillance technologies by law enforcement agencies. To do so, we examine ALPR data-
sharing practices by the Victoria Police Department (‘VICPD’) in British Columbia (‘BC’) 
and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (‘RCMP’).  
 ALPR data collected by VICPD was transferred to the equivalent RCMP database via a 
portable USB hard-drive. The aim was to identify ‘hits’ that detected stolen vehicles. RCMP 
personnel manually deleted the identities of all ‘non-hit’ vehicles with no recorded criminal 
or road traffic violations, but retained the time and location of all vehicles photographed by 
the VICPD system. The BC Privacy Commissioner criticised these data-sharing and 
retention practices. Most provinces expressly exempt police from informing citizens that 
their personal data is being collected and potentially exchanged with other agencies for a 
valid law enforcement, criminal intelligence or investigative purpose (FIPPA 1996 (BC) 
s 33.1(2)(a) and sch 1; FIPPA 1990 (Ont) ss 42(1)(f)–(g); Denham 2012:21). However, the 
‘indiscriminate reach’ (Denham 2012:29) of ALPR in collecting ‘information about the law-
abiding activities of individuals that the police have no reason to believe relates to criminal 
activity’ (Denham 2012:23) also contradicts principles of reasonable suspicion that require 
police to gather targeted evidence about crime suspects. Consequently, the Privacy 
Commissioner directed the Ministry of Justice to specify where and why ALPR was being 
deployed. VICPD was also directed to reconfigure its system to automatically ‘delete 
personal information associated with “non-hits” immediately after the system determines it 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
1  Canadian policing involves federal contracts between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and provincial or 
municipal agencies. Australian state policing involves a combination of state and territory police agencies that 
collaborate with the Australian Federal Police (‘AFP’) on certain criminal investigations, while policing in the 
Australian Capital Territory is provided solely by the AFP under a renewable contract.  
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does not match a license plate number in the Alert Listing’ (Denham 2012:28). However, 
VICPD Chief Jamie Graham ‘respectfully disagreed’ with this directive, arguing the 
benefits of improved law enforcement efficiency superseded concerns relating to 
maintaining the privacy of vehicles with no previous ‘hits’ entered into each ALPR 
database. 
Aside from the Chief’s challenging of this privacy ruling, the example reveals the 
acceptance of using technical constraints to protect information privacy as a key method of 
governing surveillance technologies in contemporary law enforcement. This approach is 
exemplified in Ontario, where Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian pioneered the 
integration of PbD into law enforcement technologies (Lippert and Walby 2013). In recent 
public presentations, Commissioner Cavoukian has argued privacy law should not prevent 
law enforcement agencies from adopting new surveillance technologies, as PbD facilitates 
the use of ‘security technologies enabling privacy’ (‘STEPS’). Cavoukian identifies 
numerous STEPS considered to successfully incorporate PbD, including 3-D body scanners 
to screen airline passengers, improved methods of biometric encryption, and technical 
protocols used in ‘IT systems, accountable business practices, and physical design and 
networked infrastructure’. While promoting improved data protection, PbD also legitimises 
the introduction and normalisation of contentious new surveillance projects by Canadian law 
enforcement agencies. Ontario’s PbD policy equates privacy with enhanced data security, 
while overlooking several additional dimensions of privacy regulation regarding the control 
of personal information and clarifying the institutional, social, political or administrative 
limits of its collection and use in contemporary law enforcement (Leman-Langlois 
2013:113).  
Australian information privacy law and policy 
While Australia has no equivalent to Canada’s constitutional protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure, federal (Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)) and state (for example, 
Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic)) legislation empowers Privacy Commissioners2 with 
equivalent investigative and compliance powers. Specific legislation also governs the 
collection, storage and dissemination of information using surveillance devices 
(Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic)). A national charter of rights does not exist, although 
in 2008 a non-binding legislative Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities became 
fully operational in Victoria. This legislation includes a general ‘right to privacy’ aimed at 
preserving any person’s ‘family, home or correspondence’ from unlawful or arbitrary 
interference under any legislative enactment, justiciable ruling or the activities of any state 
and municipal authorities (Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
s 13). There is no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the use of surveillance 
devices in public spaces. A common law tort enables suspected invasions of privacy to be 
litigated in some jurisdictions as a proxy for the lack of explicit constitutional recognition of 
the right to privacy under Australian law (Butler 2005; NSWLRC 2007; VLRC 2010: 
128–68). 
State and Federal Privacy Commissioners commonly develop protocols or Codes of 
Conduct in collaboration with public and private sector industries governing the collection, 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
2  From 1 November 2010, the Commonwealth Office of the Privacy Commissioner was integrated into the 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. This amended structure also applies at state level to 
oversee the implementation of extensive information privacy reforms introduced into the Australian Federal 
Parliament in May 2012.  
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use and disclosure of personal information for specified purposes. Several additional 
legislative requirements preserve the accuracy, security, international transfer and 
anonymity of an individual’s data, but state legislation only applies to government and 
municipal authorities or small businesses with an annual turnover of A$3.6 million or less. 
Unlike Canada, where freedom of information is incorporated into privacy legislation, 
separate federal and state laws govern the disclosure of information held by public 
authorities. However, information regarding ‘the prevention, detection, investigation, 
prosecution or punishment of criminal offences or breach of a law’ and the ‘protection of 
public revenue’ (Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) sch 1 ss 2.1(d)–(h)) is normally 
exempt from these provisions.  
In general, Australian police agencies may use ‘a data surveillance device, a listening 
device, an optical surveillance device or a tracking device’ (ALRC 2008:415) without a 
warrant in a public place (Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); NPIA 2009:18). Warrants 
are customarily obtained for the installation of tracking devices in private places, although 
some legal variations are evident in state legislation. For example, New South Wales allows 
‘the installation, use or maintenance of a tracking device for a lawful purpose’ (Surveillance 
Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 9(2)(c); VLRC 2010:114) without a warrant. The terms ‘law 
enforcement purpose’ and ‘crime’ are particularly broad and are arguably the most 
significant barrier to reasoned public debate about the deployment of new surveillance 
technologies by Australian law enforcement agencies (Palmer and Warren 2012). There is 
further doubt about whether ‘crime’ includes regulatory infractions or road traffic 
infringements enforced by the public police. However, the artificial separation of competing 
privacy and security interests in contemporary law enforcement discourse mirrors equivalent 
concerns identified in Canadian and United States literatures (Solove 2011). This is of 
concern in light of CrimTrac’s preference to host a centralised data storage and 
dissemination facility that maximises the ‘national security’ and ‘community safety’ 
benefits of ANPR technology, and the willingness of police to adopt untested surveillance 
and identity verification technologies to improve efficiencies in major criminal 
investigations, fine enforcement and crime prevention (Brown et al 2013; VLRC 2010). 
ALPR and privacy in Ontario, Canada 
The use of ALPR in Ontario precedes PbD, where it has been deployed at on- and off-ramps 
on a select number of tollways in the Greater Toronto Area since 1997. In 2003, a Mobile 
License Plate Recognition (‘MLPR’) system was piloted by the Toronto Police Service 
(‘TPS’) to help detect stolen vehicles in public car parks, which was subsequently 
investigated by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (‘OIPC’) in 
Ontario. A ‘street sweeper’ camera system developed by a Montreal company that marketed 
this technology to both government departments and private businesses was mounted atop a 
TPS vehicle. The images were then conveyed from the TPS system to the RCMP’s 
Canadian Police Information Centre (‘CPIC’) database, where they were cross-matched with 
stolen vehicle records. On receiving an automatic alert identifying any ‘hits’ matching the 
MLPR photographs with CPIC data, the parking officer would save the scanned licence 
plate number in the MLPR system for further processing (OIPC 2003). These images could 
be retained for up to 72 hours. Reports indicated the pilot helped to recover 153 stolen 
vehicles and was widely applauded by police for offsetting the complexity and delays 
associated with manual investigations. The recovery of more stolen vehicles within 30 days 
of the initial report to police also generated cost savings to the insurance industry due to the 
marked reduction in the number of replacement vehicles issued to policyholders. 
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The OIPC investigated whether this use of MLPR complied with both national and 
provincial privacy requirements after a citizen alleged the ‘street sweeper’ violated 
constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure (Constitution Act 1982 
(Can) s 8). Commissioner Cavoukian examined whether the disclosure of all licence plate 
photographs to the corporation in Montreal — for evaluating the system’s efficiency and 
eliminating false positives in the automated data-matching software — contravened the 
exemptions on the collection and distribution of personal information for ‘law enforcement 
matters’ under the MFIPPA 2007 (Ont) ss 8 and 29. Cavoukian (OIPC 2003) noted licence 
plates are a form of personal information, as the unique number is assigned to an identifiable 
driver regardless of their previous history of ‘hits’ or ‘non-hits’. However, the use of MLPR 
was considered a valid law enforcement activity under the MFIPPA because the TPS 
expressed a clear rationale for collecting, using and storing the photographic information to 
identify stolen vehicles. The disclosure of MLPR photographs to the Montreal company also 
complied with the MFIPPA, because TPS only transferred the licence plate image and no 
identifiable names or personal information associated with any photographed ‘hits’. 
Cavoukian recommended police and third parties, such as the Montreal company, should 
sign contracts with specific clauses preventing the further disclosure of any personal 
information exchanged for an authorised law enforcement purpose under MFIPPA. TPS and 
any other law enforcement agencies contemplating the introduction of MLPR were 
instructed to undertake a privacy impact assessment with the OIPC’s assistance.  
From 2011, several police services across southern and central Ontario began using 
similar ALPR technologies. South Simcoe Police installed an ALPR system with the 
capacity to scan 750 licence plate numbers per officer shift compared to the usual 125 
undertaken through manual searches. This pilot involved the installation of a C$17 000 
camera system on a police vehicle operated by the Traffic and Marine Unit. One police 
operator remarked that ‘it will do the job of an officer’ and ‘it makes me twice as efficient as 
I could be’ (King 2011). However, such claims provide limited insight into the effectiveness 
of this technology to reduce prohibited behaviours. In addition, numerous ‘false hits’ were 
identified in this pilot as the Ontario licence plate is especially difficult for the technology to 
read. In 2011, the Ontario Provincial Police (‘OPP’) also commenced a pilot involving the 
installation of ALPR technology in four cruisers and an SUV operating near the cities of 
London and Cornwall. This mobile deployment was vetted by Commissioner Cavoukian to 
ensure all ‘non-hit’ information conformed to PbD requirements and was retained for no 
more than 20 minutes.  
In 2012, Ottawa Police Service (‘OPS’) began using ALPR, but its widespread adoption 
was stalled pending a series of public consultations and the completion of a privacy impact 
assessment at Commissioner Cavoukian’s insistence. Although the OPS ALPR system 
purged all ‘non-hit’ data every 20 minutes, Cavoukian advocated automatic deletion in line 
with PbD requirements (Boutilier 2013). A subsequent video blog titled ‘Commissioner’s 
Corner’ reiterated Cavoukian’s position that PbD can be integrated in all ALPR systems 
without compromising individual privacy: 
 
 Our [OIPC’s] interest is making sure the people who are not on the hit list, their information is not retained … 
What I have asked our police forces in Ontario to do is that whenever there is a non-hit, I want that information 
automatically deleted … from the system immediately because it does not even belong there. 
 Police officials in Ontario endorse PbD because it adds legitimacy to new forms of mass 
surveillance and automated data sorting that improve law enforcement efficiency. While 
Australian Privacy Commissioners have yet to examine ANPR as extensively as 
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Commissioner Cavoukian, below we suggest PbD has limited capacity to quell the appeal of 
this technology. 
ANPR and privacy in Victoria, Australia 
ANPR is part of an array of road safety initiatives introduced throughout Australia since the 
1960s to assist police to ‘combat dangerous driving and bring down the road toll’ (Hamblin 
2013). In the early 1990s, Victoria’s vehicle registration authority first incorporated ANPR 
into fixed-speed and red-light cameras at accident ‘hot spots’ throughout the state. Since 
2010, ANPR has been installed in several police vehicles ‘to record the details of passing 
vehicles and detect those that may be unregistered or stolen’ or ‘to search for persons of 
interest’ (VLRC 2010:114). ANPR also enables vehicles linked to outstanding toll 
payments, lapsed registration and dangerous driving offences to be identified as ‘hits’. 
Stolen vehicles can also be manually flagged in police systems and automatically compared 
with photographs of thousands of vehicles taken at a particular place or time, either through 
privately administered systems or equivalent technologies operated by interstate or federal 
police agencies. 
Victoria’s ANPR system records the time, date and location where the image of the 
vehicle’s front licence plate was taken. This data is then automatically cross-matched with 
relevant police and vehicle registration records. Since 2012, ‘up to six vans fitted with 
ANPR cameras, which can scan up to 2600 plates an hour’ (Harris and Moor 2012) have 
been deployed after several trials conducted throughout the state since September 2009 
involving the collection of over 300 000 vehicle records and the detection of over 6000 road 
traffic offences (VLRC 2010:33). Victoria’s BlueNet ANPR system is considered to situate 
Victoria Police as Australia’s leading ‘innovative thinkers in the space of road policing 
enforcement’ (Hooper 2013:15) and is widely publicised as a necessary deterrent in line 
with various other automated road surveillance systems, such as speed and red-light cameras 
(VLRC 2010:37, 61; O’Malley 2013). 
The BlueNet system is linked to databases enabling the rapid identification of ‘illegal 
vehicles’ for further interception and formal processing. Its mobility enhances the ‘strategic 
targeting of high-risk unauthorised drivers, unregistered vehicles and high-risk areas’ (Kaila 
2012). BlueNet automatically matches photographic data with ‘hot lists’ of ‘stolen vehicles, 
expired registration and vehicles whose registered owner is disqualified … or who is wanted 
for non-payment of fines or other offences’ (Staff Writer 2011). Claims that more than one-
eighth of fatal motor vehicle accidents involve unlicensed drivers or unregistered vehicles 
(Harris and Moor 2012) add legitimacy to ANPR in helping to reduce annual road fatality 
rates and accident-related trauma in Victoria. 
 The launch of Operation Break Up in late 2012 highlighted BlueNet’s capacity to detect 
road traffic violations in Victoria’s beachside resort towns (Kaila 2012). A report in 
Geelong during January 2013 indicated ‘(o)ne in every 70 people checked by police … 
faced fines or charges’ (Hamblin 2013), while over 6000 vehicles scanned in one day at the 
Mornington Peninsula during the Australia Day long weekend identified 973 vehicles linked 
to outstanding warrants and A$300 000 in unpaid fines. This ‘hit’ rate exceeds 16 per cent 
for outstanding warrants alone, with fines involving various breaches of minor licensing 
requirements, such as failing to inform road traffic authorities of a change of address, as 
well as numerous vehicle registration, noise emissions and related safety violations (Evans 
2013; Hamblin 2013). The Department of Justice (2013) has also introduced ANPR to 
‘enhance Sheriff’s Operations … to crack down on unpaid fines and outstanding warrants’. 
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The deterrent value of ANPR is therefore clear, given its potential to enhance the detection 
of road traffic offences, parking violations and unpaid fines.  
 Neither Victorian nor national privacy regulators have examined ANPR. A holistic 
examination of the national privacy regime by the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(‘ALRC’) (2008) referred briefly to the potential of CCTV and ANPR to ‘reduce the need 
for live monitoring of surveillance systems and reduce costs associated with recording 
irrelevant activity when used with “intelligent software”’ (ALRC 2008:414), such as pattern 
(VLRC 2010:114) or facial recognition technology (Information Integrity Solutions 2008:8). 
However, this report offered little regulatory guidance for managing data obtained or stored 
in these systems. A major review of ANPR by a Queensland Parliamentary Committee 
highlighted the value of automated ‘traffic surveillance’ to improve police ‘operational 
efficiency’, while contributing to improvements in ‘public order and public health by way of 
reduced road crashes’ (Parliamentary Travelsafe Committee 2008:1, 16). ANPR is 
considered valuable when used in conjunction with random breath and drug testing, given 
the latter is currently unable to detect illicit drugs that might contribute to driver impairment 
(Wilson 2012). Mobile vehicle tracking can also assist with criminal investigations (VLRC 
2010:61) and has been used to seize firearms from known ‘gangsters’. Senior police extol 
the benefits of ANPR in helping to intercept ‘the same targets three times in three different 
unregistered cars … in one night’ (Staff Writer 2011). 
An investigation by the Victorian Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’) (2010) 
recommended the establishment of an independent body to regulate all forms of electronic 
surveillance deployed in public places by government authorities and law enforcement 
agencies. Part of this organisation’s mandate would involve receiving periodic reports about 
the use of ANPR by Victoria Police and other public organisations involved in road traffic 
control and vehicle licensing; the incremental review of any regulatory requirements; and 
articulating a reasonable expectation of privacy in public places to ensure the responsible 
and proportionate use of surveillance remains confined to ‘legitimate’ public administrative 
functions. The VLRC did not consider that ANPR contravened restrictions associated with 
optical surveillance devices, which are not to be used to monitor activity in public spaces 
(VLRC 2010:114). However, Victoria Police considered any restrictions on the use of 
tracking devices were ‘administratively unworkable’ given the need ‘to obtain a warrant 
each time they wish to use ANPR’. Supplementary statements highlighting the value of 
ANPR for ‘emergency services in the case of missing persons’ and the contradiction of 
allowing Victoria’s road traffic authority and private ‘tollway operators … to continue to 
use ANPR for road safety and tolling purposes’ were also noted (VLRC 2010:114). The 
VLRC questioned current ‘vague and unnecessarily broad’ legislation enabling police to 
deploy tracking devices ‘without consent’ and capture ‘vast amounts of information about 
individuals who are behaving lawfully’, while legitimising ‘function creep’ and the use of 
ANPR data for ‘unintended purposes’ (VLRC 2010:115). Regulatory options included the 
introduction of warning signs indicating where and when police deployed ANPR, and 
specific legislation governing the use of ANPR data for law enforcement purposes.  
 CrimTrac’s proposed nationalisation of vehicle registration data can be viewed as part of 
the ongoing centralisation of Australia’s strategic law enforcement priorities since the late 
1990s (James and Warren 2010). In 2006, CrimTrac commissioned a scoping study into 
ANPR based on consultations with representatives from all state police services, the 
Australian Federal Police and various national criminal intelligence and transportation 
authorities (CrimTrac 2009a:46). While the final report has not been publicly released 
(Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 2008), various sources 
indicate the preference for ‘an integrated national ANPR network’ (CrimTrac 2009b:30) 
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with a centralised data management and distribution capacity (Derby 2011:164), or the 
development of ‘common standards’ for the ‘interoperability’ of discrete systems already 
introduced by Australia’s state policing services (CrimTrac 2010:56). The centralised 
coordination of ANPR data flows promises significant road safety improvements, and 
efficient interagency cooperation to enhance national security and border control 
(Information Integrity Solutions 2008). Independent consultations with privacy regulators 
and various community advocacy groups raised concerns over whether it was ‘necessary’ to 
collect information relating to vehicles associated with no previous road traffic or criminal 
violations, enable such data to be shared on a national basis, or allow for its subsequent de-
identification and centralised storage for up to five years. The report ultimately found these 
concerns did not offset the logical ‘business case’ favouring ANPR to improve law 
enforcement efficiency, reduce the cost of criminal investigations, enhance road safety in 
known accident ‘hot spots’ and produce financial benefits for all road users through reduced 
insurance premiums.  
 Although PbD is not expressly adopted in Australia, Victoria Police must invoke 
appropriate ‘cryptographic controls’ for all surveillance technologies and electronic data 
(CLEDS 2007:48–53). However, in 2010 an independent review found many internal data 
management policies did not comply with appropriate encryption or security standards 
(Office of Police Integrity 2010:8). Law enforcement exemptions ensure state and national 
privacy regulators do not review police information management policies.  
The scant attention to the privacy implications of ANPR in Victoria and nationally is 
disconcerting in light of Queensland’s Parliamentary investigation in 2008. This report 
identified the need for several procedural safeguards, including ‘clearly articulated 
purposes’ for the collection, distribution and use of ANPR data; clear restrictions on the 
agencies and personnel allowed to access personal information; the immediate removal of 
data relating to vehicles with no offence history; and the introduction of secure data 
transportation, access, exchange and encryption arrangements. This last recommendation 
incorporates the logic of PbD within a holistic independent regulatory and complaints 
structure, with the power to impose ‘severe penalties’ for data misuse (Parliamentary 
Travelsafe Committee 2008:21). However, these issues remain unheeded in light of 
CrimTrac’s proposed national approach to ANPR and recent developments associated with 
Victoria’s mobile BlueNet system. 
Questioning ALPR/ANPR 
The artificial divide between privacy and security (Solove 2011) associated with mobile and 
fixed ALPR/ANPR systems raises an additional question of whether this technology is 
effective in reducing road traffic violations. While the efficient recovery of stolen vehicles 
might reduce insurance premiums for the benefit of all road users, the capacity for increased 
camera surveillance to alter driver behaviour and improve road safety remains debatable. Of 
concern is the reliance on questionable data-profiling techniques in deploying ALPR/ANPR 
at specific locations, during particular time periods or against certain classes of road users 
considered at risk of causing accidents that might lead to serious injury or death. Harcourt 
(2007) provides a useful two-phase critique that suitably reveals these limits of 
ALPR/ANPR technology. 
According to Harcourt, the deployment of fixed or mobile ALPR/ANPR systems at 
particular locations based on higher ‘hit rates’ compared with other geographic areas 
constitutes a form of profiling. To justify using camera surveillance and automated data 
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matching at ‘hot spots’ or during ‘hot times’ would involve proof that such deployment will 
decrease overall levels of prohibited driving behaviour or infractions beyond these locations 
and times. Attributing longer-term decreases in prohibited behaviour to the use of these 
technologies, as can be seen in the justifications for ANPR in Australia (Kaila 2012), is also 
ill-conceived, as such reductions may be due to numerous factors, including changing 
attitudes toward driving, improved vehicle and road design, and increases in informal forms 
of regulation (O’Malley 2013). To the extent that ALPR/ANPR is video surveillance, 
justifying its introduction in line with the Ontario Privacy Commissioner’s guidelines 
requires showing other less intrusive law enforcement technologies have been tried and 
were found to be ineffective (OIPC 2007). Alternatives to ALPR/ANPR do not appear to 
have been considered in either Ontario or Victoria. The primary motives for introducing this 
technology seem to be improved road safety via rapid recovery of stolen vehicles and 
streamlined enforcement of outstanding warrants and fines for offences likely to be 
unrelated to driving and traffic control. 
 Harcourt (2007:23–5) would argue that effectiveness is best judged by considering the 
comparative ‘elasticity’ between groups in targeted locations and those in other locations 
immune from ALPR/ANPR surveillance. If drivers in targeted locations are less elastic in 
changing their driving behaviour than those in other locations, or if drivers in other locations 
are more elastic than those in targeted locations, ALPR/ANPR will have no deterrent effect. 
Disproportionate targeting might even increase aggregate driving violations. This means that 
using trends in recorded hit rates as the measure for deciding where to locate ALPR/ANPR 
cameras in the hope of maximising the potential to detect further violations can increase the 
prohibited driving behaviour within the jurisdiction. Harcourt’s insightful claim about 
comparative ‘elasticity’ has not been considered in relation to any aforementioned road 
safety initiatives, and depends on the type of behaviour targeted and the use of predictive 
actuarial methods to decide where, when and which technologies to deploy to help detect 
these violations.  
To offer one of many possible examples, imagine the failure to update annual vehicle 
registration details as a symptom of disproportionate surveillance targeting motorists in 
certain low-income areas or resort locations at peak holiday times. Those with prior ‘hits’ 
may have comparatively less income, time after work hours or other practical burdens to 
impede compliance compared with middle-income earners residing in locations where 
ALPR/ANPR is not deployed. The latter group may recognise their area is rarely targeted 
for road traffic surveillance and feel freer to let their registrations lapse than previously. 
Their preparedness to challenge financial penalties or seek concessions to the strict 
enforcement of licensing violations (O’Malley 2013) reinforces the continuance of profiling 
in recognised ‘hot spots’.  
 The ‘ratchet effect’ is an additional self-fulfilling element of law enforcement 
surveillance. Proportionately higher ‘hit rates’ in certain communities provide the strategic 
evidence to justify repeated deployment of ALPR/ANPR in ‘hot spots’, while other areas 
remain immune from surveillance (Harcourt 2007:147). Such profiling might legitimise 
further discriminatory targeting of certain population groups or regions, based on empirical 
claims that ‘unauthorised drivers create extra risks on our roads and are commonly over-
represented in road trauma’ (Kaila 2012). These patterns are identified in the 
disproportionate use of mobile vehicle surveillance in some urban enclaves across the 
United States (Meehan and Ponder 2002; Koper, Taylor and Woods 2013). The fully 
randomised deployment of mobile ALPR/ANPR systems regardless of location is one 
possible remedy to enhance the prospect that all drivers in all locations could potentially be 
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subject to police surveillance. Although randomised spatial deployment is impossible with 
fixed ALPR/ANPR cameras, Victoria’s mobile BlueNet system makes this feasible.  
 However, when applied to ALPR/ANPR, Harcourt’s critique of profiling loses some 
footing where population management is based on abstracted notions of ‘dividualism’, ‘data 
doubles’ and their assemblage across multiple policing agencies (Haggerty and Ericson 
2000) through centrally coordinated information flows via identical or interoperable 
technologies. If ALPR/ANPR resources are equally distributed geographically and 
temporally, comparative elasticity is eroded as ‘the profile becomes the population’ and all 
road users become subject to ubiquitous surveillance. Harcourt did foresee that each 
enforcement ratchet would produce fewer differences between ‘hits’ and ‘non-hits’. This 
reasoning presumes that the rationale for the placement of surveillance technologies requires 
constant upgrading or randomisation. While Ontario guidelines indicate that police must 
justify resource deployment, there is no evidence to suggest this is happening. In Victoria, 
this occurs through periodic road traffic blitzes in certain locations or during holiday 
periods. These rather loose justifications allow targeted surveillance to become mass 
surveillance, as per the CrimTrac model. As such, Harcourt’s critique may become 
outmoded before it can be systematically applied to question surveillance practices in 
contemporary law enforcement.   
One key objective of CrimTrac’s preference for national ANPR data management 
involves maximising the potential for rapid automated electronic data sorting. However, this 
proposal is also subject to resistance from state police. Victoria Police representatives have 
expressed the preference to retain the ability to select ‘operational systems and architecture’ 
that best suit local information and intelligence requirements. Rather than supporting a 
‘massive national system’, this logic favours greater interoperability between discrete or 
established systems, so data ‘can be easily shared between and accessed by other agencies’ 
(Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement 2012:5–6). Broader definitions of 
‘enforcement related activity’ to encompass ‘surveillance … intelligence gathering activities 
and other monitoring … protective or custodial activities’ (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 2012:58) under proposed amendments to national privacy laws 
favour both state and national policing, security and safety interests. However, this shift also 
reinforces ongoing tensions between federal and state power over information management 
that gradually creep towards nationalisation while encountering new modes of state police 
resistance. This tension replicates political debates associated with new forms of state 
surveillance that are commonly challenged by dedicated individuals and interest groups 
using the very platforms upon which such surveillance depends (O’Malley 2013).  
 Perhaps the most salient issue challenges arguments that suggest personal information no 
longer matters to surveillance processes. This claim is significant in relation to the use of 
technology by police agencies to detect crime and promote road safety in each jurisdiction. 
Even unified willingness to deploy ALPR/ANPR for improved criminal investigations and 
streamlined fine enforcement confronts significant legal and cultural distinctions relating to 
the permissible scope of law enforcement surveillance. While municipal policing in Canada 
contrasts with Australia’s larger state agencies, the purpose of ‘law enforcement’ is open to 
constitutional protection and certain presumptions involving reasonable suspicion relating to 
surveillance in public and private spaces. This issue has far less resonance in Australia, 
partly due to the longstanding acceptance of ANPR, ‘random breath testing’ and red light 
cameras. Hence, the creep of population surveillance is more considerable on Australia’s 
roads. This promises to extend to other classes of road users — motorcyclists — who have 
traditionally not been legally required to display a front numberplate due to ongoing debates 
regarding the development of an appropriate and safe mode of attachment. Victoria Police 
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claim ‘almost 20 000 riders who sped past Victoria’s front-facing traffic cameras’ since 
2009 have successfully avoided up to 25 000 unenforceable demerit points and A$4 million 
in fines (Moor 2013). Therefore, the cultural acceptance of reducing road deaths and injury 
at all costs through blanket ANPR surveillance is easy to imagine in contemporary 
Australia. 
 However, the alternative ‘Canadian way’ involving PbD is unlikely to curb enthusiasm 
for the efficiencies promised by ALPR. One contradiction we have noted is that PbD 
legitimates new mass surveillance practices. This finding has international relevance, as 
Privacy Commissions face numerous challenges in garnering compliance with privacy 
protocols, while PbD enables the efficient incorporation of a technical design rubric that 
accepts the inevitability of more surveillance that happens to play by certain rules. Whether 
this approach protects individual privacy or promotes greater road safety through the 
acceptable deployment of new technologies remains as contentious as Australia’s pervasive 
expectation of mass road traffic surveillance and a proposed national ANPR data repository. 
Conclusion 
New automated law enforcement technologies raise the prospect of expanding electronic 
surveillance or digital dragnets into the lives of ordinary citizens. Such technologies erode 
legal requirements for reasonable suspicion that provide due process protections under the 
criminal law. Indeed, the idea that personal data should only be used for purposes related to 
its original collection is fading. As digital sorting capacities expand, new laws and 
technological developments legitimise contentious data-sharing practices among multiple 
public and private agencies. The schism between regulating individual privacy, criminal 
enforcement and new securitisation measures continues as the capacity for data sharing now 
transcends international borders and accepted information privacy and security requirements 
(Rule 2007). The potential integration of road traffic safety and national security in some 
contexts is especially contentious for conflating the scales of security and facilitating the 
expansion of various pre-crime and preventative policing measures, such as enhanced stop, 
search, identity verification and seizure powers (see Zedner 2009). Additional concerns 
regarding false positives, data protection and the movement of individuals with no prior 
criminal history add weight to concerns about the viability of privacy protections associated 
ALPR/ANPR.  
Harcourt’s (2007) critique of law enforcement profiling may become weaker in the 
increasingly dividuised contexts of road traffic enforcement, when ‘the profile becomes the 
population’ through the deployment of ALPR/ANPR. Nevertheless, this approach raises the 
fundamental and frequently avoided question of ALPR/ANPR’s efficacy in reducing 
prohibited behaviours, rather than its widely recognised benefits in enhancing police 
efficiency. Perhaps of greatest concern is that neither PbD in Canada, nor Australia’s 
distinct lack of privacy protocols for the use of ANPR, prevent the expanded use of these 
systems or related surveillance technologies in contemporary law enforcement. 
Statutes 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
Constitution Act 1982 (Can) 
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Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1996 (BC) 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1990 (Ont) 
Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) 
Municipal Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection Act 2007 (Ont) 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000 (Can) 
Privacy Act 1985 (Can) 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) 
Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) 
References 
Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) (2008) For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law 
and Practice (Report 108) (12 August 2008) <http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-108> 
Boutilier A (2013) ‘License Scanners: Privacy Chief Wants Ottawa Police to Work With Her’, Metro 
News (online), 8 January 2013 <http://metronews.ca/news/ottawa/500995/licence-scanners-privacy-
chief-wants-ottawa-police-to-work-with-her/>  
Briody M and Prenzler T (2005) ‘DNA Databases and Property Crime: A False Promise’ (2005) 37(2) 
Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 73 
Brown M, Landsdell G, Saunders B and Eriksson A (2013) ‘“I’m sorry but you’re just not that 
special …” Reflecting on the “Special Circumstances” Provisions of the Infringements Act 2006 (Vic)’ 
(2013) 24(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 375 
Butler D (2005) ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia’ (2005) 29(2) Melbourne University Law 
Review 339 
Cavoukian A (2011) ‘Find Ways to Deliver Both Security and Privacy’, Presentation delivered at the 
Canadian Society for Industrial Security Annual Meeting, 30 May 2011, IPC 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Presentations-and-Speeches/Presentations-and-Speeches-
Summary/?id=1074>  
Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data Security (‘CLEDS’) (2007) Standards for Victoria Police 
Law Enforcement Data Security (July 2007) <http://www.cleds.vic.gov.au/content.asp? 
document_id=11976> 
Cousineau M (2013) ‘The Global War on Terror and Automatic License Plate Recognition’ (2013) 
50(1) Canadian Review of Sociology 74 
CrimTrac (2008) Annual Report 07–08 (September 2008) <http://www.crimtrac.gov.au/documents/ 
AnnualReport0708-FullReport.pdf> 
CrimTrac (2009a) Annual Report 2008–09 (September 2009) <http://www.crimtrac.gov.au/ 
documents/Crimtrac_0809_full.pdf> 
NOVEMBER 2013  PRIVACY GOVERNANCE AND ROAD TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE 581 
CrimTrac (2009b) CrimTrac Overview 2009 (June 2009) Commonwealth of Australia 
<https://senate.aph.gov.au/submissions/comittees/viewdocument.aspx?id=dd60984f-33e2-4836-85a4-
690052ca7914> 
CrimTrac (2010) CrimTrac Annual Report 2009–2010 (September 2010) Commonwealth of Australia 
<http://www.crimtrac.gov.au/documents/CrimTrac_0910_full.pdf> 
Deleuze G (1992) ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ (1992) 61 October 3 
Denham E (2012) Use of Automated Licence Plate Recognition Technology by the Victoria Police 
Department (Investigation Report F12-04) (15 November 2012), Office of the Information and 
Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia <http://www.oipc.bc.ca/rulings/investigation-
reports.aspx> 
Department of Justice (Vic) (2013) ‘Automatic Number Plate Recognition’ <http://www.justice. 
vic.gov.au/home/justice+system/sheriffs+in+victoria/automatic+number+plate+recognition>  
Derby P (2011) ‘Policing in the Age of Information: Automated Number Plate Recognition’ in 
Doyle A, Lippert R and Lyon D (eds), Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera Surveillance, 
Routledge, 2011 
Diffie W and Landau S (2010) Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption, 
MIT Press, 2nd ed, 2010 
Evans J (2013) ‘Police Nab More than 1000 Motorists Using New BlueNet Number Plate 
Technology’, Herald Sun (online), 29 January 2013 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-
order/police-nab-more-than-1000-motorists-using-new-bluenet-number-plate-technology/story-
fnat79vb-1226564337115> 
Gaumont N and Babineau D (2008) ‘The Role of Automatic License Plate Recognition Technology in 
Policing: Results from the Lower Mainland of British Columbia’, The Police Chief (online), 
November 2008 <http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
display_arch&article_id=1671&issue_id=112008> 
Hamblin A (2013) ‘Hi-tech Police Patrol Nabs Offenders’, Geelong Advertiser (online), 14 January 
2013 <http://onsale.geelong.com/articles/2013/01/14/Hi-tech_police_patrol_nabs_offenders/> 
Harcourt B (2007) Against Prediction, University of Chicago Press, 2007 
Harris A and Moor K (2012) ‘“Cops” Hoon Trap in the Suburbs’, Herald Sun (online), 2 April 2012 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/archive/news/cops-hoon-trap-in-the-suburbs/story-fn7x8me2-
1226315924326> 
Harris K D (2013) Privacy on the Go: Recommendations for the Mobile Ecosystem (January 2013) 
State of California Department of Justice <http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/pdfs/privacy/privacy_ 
on_the_go.pdf> 
Hier S P and Walby K (2011) ‘Privacy Pragmatism and Streetscape Video Surveillance in Canada’ 
(2011) 16(2) International Sociology 844 
Hooper S-J (2013) ‘Leading the Way in Road Policing’, Police Life: The Victoria Police Magazine 
(online), Autumn 2013, 14–15 <http://issuu.com/policelife/docs/policelife_autumn2013> 
Information and Privacy Commissioner (‘IPC’) (2003) Privacy Investigation: The Toronto Police 
Service’s Use of Mobile License Plate Recognition Technology to Find Stolen Vehicles (29 April 
582 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE VOLUME 25 NUMBER 2 
 
2003) Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario <http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/ 
mon/5000/10311696.pdf> 
Information and Privacy Commissioner (‘IPC’) (2007) Guidelines for Using Video Surveillance 
Cameras in Public Places (September 2007) Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/video-e.pdf> 
Information Integrity Solutions (2008) Privacy Impact Assessment Consultation Paper: Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition CrimTrac Scoping Study, June 2008 <http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/ 
ANPR-Background-Paper.doc> 
James S and Warren I (2010) ‘Australian Police Responses to Transnational Crime and Terrorism’ in 
Eterno J A and Das D K (eds), Police Practices in Global Perspective, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010 
Johnson M (2011) ‘Status Quo Surveillance — The Legal Framework for Camera Surveillance in 
Canada’ in Doyle A, Lippert R and Lyon D (eds), Eyes Everywhere: The Global Growth of Camera 
Surveillance, Routledge, 2011 
Kaila J (2012) ‘BlueNet Police Car Can Detect Unregistered Vehicles and Unlicensed Drivers While 
on the Move’, Herald Sun (online), 14 December 2012 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-
order/bluenet-police-car-can-detect-unregistered-vehicles-and-unlicensed-drivers-while-on-the-
move/story-fnat79vb-1226536679894> 
Koper C S, Taylor B G and Woods D J (2013) ‘A Randomized Test of Initial and Residual Deterrence 
from Directed Patrols and Use of License Plate Readers at Crime Hot Spots’ (2013) 9(2) Journal of 
Experimental Criminology 213 
King M (2011) ‘Tech Could Make Traffic Cops “Twice as Efficient”’, The Barrie Examiner (online), 
13 June 2011 <http://www.thebarrieexaminer.com/2011/06/13/tech-could-make-traffic-cops-twice-as-
efficient> 
Leman-Langlois S (2008) ‘Privacy as Currency: Crime, Information and Control in Cyberspace’ in 
Leman-Langlois S (ed), Technocrime: Technology, Crime and Social Control, Willan Publishing, 
2008 
Lippert R and Walby K (2013) ‘Governing through Privacy: Authoritarian Liberalism, Law, and 
Privacy Knowledge’, Law, Culture and the Humanities (online), 26 March 2013 
<http://lch.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/03/21/1743872113478530.abstract> 
McArthur K (2012) ALPR and Digital Civil Rights (16 November 2012) Unrest.ca <http://www. 
unrest.ca/alpr-update-commissioners-investigation-report-released> 
Meehan A J and Ponder M C (2002) ‘Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial Profiling African 
American Motorists’ (2002) 19(3) Justice Quarterly 399 
Moor K (2013) ‘Motorcyclists are Free to Speed and Dodging Fines without Front Identification’, 
Herald Sun (online), 6 May 2013 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law-order/motorcyclists-are-
free-to-speed-and-dodging-fines-without-front-identification/story-fnat79vb-1226635623691> 
Murphy P (2010) ‘Police Boost Their Spy Equipment’, Herald Sun (online), 2 December 2010 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ipad/police-boost-their-spy-equipment/story-fn6bfkm6-
1225964107070> 
National Policing Improvement Agency (‘NPIA’) (2009) Practice Advice on the Management and Use 
of Automatic Number Plate Recognition, Association of Chief Police Officers 
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/crime/2009/200907CRIANP01.pdf> 
NOVEMBER 2013  PRIVACY GOVERNANCE AND ROAD TRAFFIC SURVEILLANCE 583 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) (2007) Invasion of Privacy (Consultation 
Paper 1) (May 2007) New South Wales Law Reform Commission <http://www.lawreform. 
lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/lrc/documents/pdf/cp01.pdf> 
Office of Police Integrity (2010) Information Security and the Victoria Police State Surveillance Unit 
(February 2010) IBAC <http://www.ibac.vic.gov.au/docs/default-source/opi-parliamentary-reports/ 
information-security-and-the-victoria-police-state-surveillance-unit---feb-2010-.pdf?sfvrsn=4> 
O’Malley P (2010) ‘“Simulated Justice”: Risk, Money and Telemetric Policing’ (2010) 50(5) British 
Journal of Criminology 795 
O’Malley P (2013) ‘The Politics of Mass Preventive Justice’ in Ashworth A, Zedner L and Tomlin P 
(eds), Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2013 
Palmer D and Warren I (2012) ‘Tecnología de Vigilancia y Controles Territoriales: Gobernanza y el 
Pulso de la Privacidad’ (‘Surveillance Technology and Territorial Controls: Governance and the “Lite 
Touch” of Privacy’), 217 Novatica 217 (May–June 2012) 15 
Palmer D, Warren I and Miller P (forthcoming a) ‘Privacy, Dataveillance and Crime Prevention’ in 
Michael K and Abbas R (eds) Encyclopedia of Social Network Analysis and Mining (‘ESNAM’), 
Springer 
Palmer D, Warren I and Miller P (forthcoming b) ‘ID Scanners and Überveillance in the Night Time 
Economy: Crime Prevention or Invasion of Privacy?’ in Michael K and Michael M G (eds), 
Überveillance and the Social Implications of Microchip Implants: Emerging Technologies, IGI 
Global, Hershey 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (2012) Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment 
(Enhancing Privacy Protection) Bill 2012 (23 May 2012) <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/ 
search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fems%2Fr4813_ems_00948d06-092b-
447e-9191-5706fdfa0728%22> 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement (2012) Gathering and Use of Criminal 
Intelligence (27 September 2012) Parliament of Australia <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/ 
parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=yes;orderBy=customrank;page=0;query=anpr;rec=0;resCoun
t=Default> 
Parliamentary Travelsafe Committee (Qld) (2008) Report on the Inquiry into Automatic Number Plate 
Recognition Technology (Report 51) (September 2008) Queensland Parliament 
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/committees/TSAFE/2007/anpr_technology/anpr_report
.pdf> 
Rule J B (2007) Privacy in Peril: How We Are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange for 
Security and Convenience, Oxford University Press, 2007 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (2008) ‘CrimTrac’ (Question 105) (20 
October 2008) Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra <http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/ 
Estimates/Live/legcon_ctte/estimates/bud_0910/ag/QON_105_CRIMTRAC.ashx> 
Solove D J (2011) Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security, Yale 
University Press, 2011 
Staff Writer (2011) ‘Mobile Automatic Number Plate Recognition Cameras Targetting Gangsters’, 
Herald Sun (online), 4 November 2011 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/snapping-up-
suspect-vehicles/story-fn7x8me2-1226185131059> 
584 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE VOLUME 25 NUMBER 2 
 
Victorian Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’) (2010) Surveillance in Public Places (Final Report 18) 
(1 June 2010) <http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/projects/surveillance-public-places/surveillance-
public-places-final-report> 
Wilson L-A (2012) ‘Exploring Illicit Drug Use and Drug Driving as Edgework’ (2012) 24(2) Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice 223 
Zedner L (2009) Security, London, 2009 
